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OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
IS BROKEN
What Is to Be Done?
Stephen Downes-Martin
In the absence of a credible numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency therecan be no objective, numbers-based assessment for Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM. The U.S. military nonetheless has attempted to conduct a numbers-
based assessment process. Thus, when a new commander and staff take over du-
ties as a regional command in Afghanistan, they inherit an operations assess-
ment process riddled with highly visible flaws that emanate from the improper
use of numbers and flawed logic. While no assessment process can be perfect or
free of any criticism, the flaws the author observed during a six-week stint
in-country are sufficiently egregious that they seriously reduce the value those
assessments provide to commanders’ decision sup-
port. In addition, the visibility of these flaws means
that military assessments, and by association the mili-
tary commanders, are rightfully distrusted by higher
civilian authority and by other organizations within
the theater. It is therefore imperative that incoming
commanders and staffs taking over responsibilities for
regional commands address these flaws to improve
decision making and to earn the trust of higher civil-
ian authority and organizations with whom they have
to work.
Staffs and commanders in Afghanistan created op-
erations assessment processes under extraordinarily
difficult circumstances while fighting, and it is ex-
traordinary how well they have done given those
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circumstances. Nevertheless, it is necessary to identify and fix the flaws in the
present operations assessment process to strengthen decision support and the
validity of the assessments, without apportioning blame or criticism. In this ar-
ticle I avoid identifying individuals or organizations as much as possible in dis-
cussing flaws in the assessments processes that I have observed. Instead, I
address the proliferation of “junk arithmetic” and flawed logic within the cur-
rently used assessment processes and discuss why regional commanders and
their staffs should care about these problems, by describing the damage to com-
manders’ credibility and decision support created by flawed processes. Finally, I
propose an approach to operations assessment that regional commanders can
immediately put into place. I do not discuss or comment on strategy, operations,
or the broader arguments concerning counterinsurgency versus counter-
terrorism. I focus solely on the operations assessment process.
Dr. Jonathan Schroden convincingly argues (in an accompanying article)
concerning operations assessment that “there is an entire failure cycle at work,
and until its associated issues are rectified, the theoretical promises of opera-
tions assessment will continue to go unrealized.” Regional commanders do not
have to wait for higher command to deal with these key issues, nor should they;
they have the authority and capability to deal with them within their own re-
gional commands. The assessment approach I propose in this article meshes
with the requests for information from higher command and fits within the op-
erational planning process of the regional command. It uses military and civil-
ian professional judgment applied to the appropriate combination of objective
and subjective data, backed up with valid arithmetic and sound logic.
WHAT IS OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT?
Joint doctrine describes assessment as “a process that measures progress of the
joint force toward mission accomplishment.”1 Joint doctrine also makes clear
that simply measuring progress is insufficient, that the assessment process must
“help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine
when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to en-
sure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and military
end state.”2
Implications of the Doctrinal Definition of Operations Assessment
How exactly does one measure progress toward accomplishing a mission? Un-
less one has already accomplished the mission, mission accomplishment or fail-
ure will occur in the future, but one does assessment in the present, using present
and past information. Therefore, by definition, operations assessment is an at-
tempt to forecast future success based on current and past experience.3 It attempts
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to provide insight into how well the command is achieving its operational objec-
tives (occurring in the future) using information from the environment (describ-
ing the present and the past). Assessment should include a measure of the gap
between the current situation and the future desired end state, the rate of closure
(or widening) of that gap and a forecast of its future rate of closure (or widen-
ing), and an assessment of the risk to the endurance of the end state after the
achievement of objectives and termination of military action.
Therefore, in order to provide decision support to the commander within the
guidelines laid down by joint doctrine, operations assessment must answer what
I call “the assessment question,” which in general has the form: “What is the like-
lihood of, and what are the risks to, the conditions for the specified end states
occurring or remaining stable if military operations are terminated on the spec-
ified date?”
In the context of Afghanistan, I propose that the assessment process at the re-
gional command level must answer the more specific question: “What is the
likelihood of, and what are the risks to, the conditions for the specified end states
occurring or remaining stable if the region transitions from coalition forces to
full Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) control on the
specified date?”4
If the operations assessment cell answers this question, the commander and
staff will be in a better position to report progress toward the objective, iden-
tify risks to achieving the objective, and propose reallocation of resources to
minimize or mitigate the risks.5 Assessing any individual line of operation or
objective is a matter of answering the assessment question in the context of the
likelihood that the end states specified for the objectives remain stable after
transition and what the risks are to those end states should transition occur.6
In my opinion, lines of operation or objectives in Afghanistan are only of in-
terest to the extent that they enable a transition of power to GIRoA by the spec-
ified date with the specified end states remaining stable.
Forecasting has a long and dubious history, full of pseudoscience, junk arith-
metic, and flawed logic, practiced by witches and listened to by kings.7 Forecast-
ing should be done using a combination of subjective professional judgment,
objective logic, (social) science, and mathematics.8 However, for many people
the differences between pseudoscience and real science are hard to spot. Fur-
thermore, approaches that are valid in one context can become invalid in others,
even if the differences in the contexts are not obvious. So although most officers
would subscribe to the notion of using valid logic, mathematics, and science
(everyone believes that they themselves are rational and logical), it is difficult
for those not explicitly educated and trained in science, analysis, and critical
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thinking to identify whether an approach is logically or scientifically valid. This
difficulty is the root cause of many of the flaws I have observed in operations as-
sessment as practiced in Afghanistan.9
Requirements for Operations Assessment
I claim that four primary requirements must be met if an operations assessment
process is to provide good decision support to a regional commander.
Assessments at the different levels of warfare (tactical, operational, strategic)
and across the instruments of national power must be linked. Linkage “up” the lev-
els of warfare means that the assessments for all districts in a region should play
major parts in the regional assessment and that the assessments for all regions
should play major parts in the national assessment. There will be emergent ef-
fects at each level that are not described by combining the assessments from
lower levels, but any assessment should provide logical reasons for them, based
on the inputs. Linkage “across” the instruments of national power provides an
integrated assessment combining the separate diplomatic, information, mili-
tary, and economics assessments from civilian and military branches of the in-
volved coalition governments.
Metrics and operational end states must be logically connected. There must be a
logical connection between the processed metrics data and a forecast of the en-
durance of the end states if transition were to occur—that is, credible and logical
reasons why the (qualitative and quantitative) values of the metrics forecast the
stability (or instability) of the end states, should transition occur. Satisfying this
requirement provides a mechanism for addressing the risks to the end states,
which is critical to supporting the commander’s decisions about the allocations
of resources needed to deal with those risks. In addition, this requirement helps
determine what metrics are required.
The appropriate metrics must be identified and the data to process them col-
lected. There are three possible failure modes here: collecting irrelevant metrics,
not collecting necessary metrics, and not knowing which of the previous two
failures are present.
The metrics data must be processed using valid logic, arithmetic, and science. In
the absence of an objective, numeric theory of counterinsurgency, it is especially
necessary that assessment staffs creatively apply subjective, professional judg-
ment to the objective and subjective metric data in order to answer the assess-
ment question.10 It is critical that such creativity not violate established rules of
logic, mathematics, or science, lest staffs generate unidentified errors when
making an assessment and damage any decision that uses the assessment.
I argue that the military assessments I have observed in Afghanistan clearly
do not satisfy these four requirements.
1 0 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 4, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss4/9
FLAWS IN ASSESSMENT AS CURRENTLY PRACTICED
I have identified by direct observation six major flaws to credible and quality oper-
ations assessments. These render assessments unfit for providing decision support
to the commander, thereby casting doubt on the credibility of the assessments and
upon the credibility of the commands and commanders that use them.
Overoptimism
An officer must be prepared and able to wear two very different hats. One of
these is the “planner and analyst” hat worn when, among other occasions, doing
assessments. The other is the “leader” hat, worn when leading subordinates in
the execution of plans. The first requires a pessimist mind-set (“the glass is
half-empty”) and focuses on critical thinking and the application of logic to
identifying and overcoming what can go wrong, in order to identify and mitigate
risk and, in turn, to ensure mission success. The second requires an optimist
mind-set (“the glass is half-full”) and a focus on inspiring subordinates, politi-
cians, and civilians to achieve objectives despite the risks.11 The two mind-sets
(pessimism and optimism) are very different, but the former is critical to assess-
ment, for the following reasons.
Operations assessment requires analysis using logic and elements of the sci-
entific method. A critical component of the scientific method is the concept of
“falsifiability”—that a hypothesis must be capable of being disproved in order to
be worthwhile. One does not prove some hypothesis to be true; instead the best
one can do is fail to disprove it.12 Similarly, in applying evidential reasoning to
distinguish between alternative explanations using “analysis of competing hy-
potheses,” one does not compare the strengths of supporting evidence for vari-
ous alternatives; instead one compares the weaknesses of evidence against
them.13 Underlying these concepts is the fact that knowledge is contingent.14
These notions are counterintuitive, but they are well established, and they un-
derlie the last three hundred years of successful Western science and the last
2,400 years of Western philosophical and logical thought.15
Officers who wear their leader hats when analyzing or assessing risk produc-
ing poor analyses or assessments, and officers who wear their analyst hats while
leading place execution at risk. In addition an officer must be very careful if de-
liberately deciding to wear a “glass half-full” hat when reporting an assessment,
whether up the chain of command (including to higher civilian authority) or
to external organizations, such as the media. The risk here is inappropriate
optimism.
In addition to the necessary critical attitude for assessment, an officer who is
required to bring creative subjective assessment to bear must be capable of ap-
plying inductive logic, which requires a divergent mind-set capable of
D O W N E S - M A R T I N 1 0 7
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recognizing patterns from partial information. The danger here is that human-
ity has evolved mostly to err on the side of false positives when looking for pat-
terns (“better safe than sorry”), which in the case of a naturally positive attitude
will lead to claiming optimistic patterns in the data.
Although military commanders and their staffs work hard at avoiding over-
optimism, they tend to bring their leadership (“we can do it”/“glass half-full”)
characteristics to bear during analysis and assessment, and there is an institu-
tional drive to produce “good-news stories.” This latter drive is partially in re-
sponse to the “bad-news stories” reported in the press, and partially in response
to the imperative to show progress in time to serve the ends of various political
timetables. It is extremely difficult, to the point of impossibility, for an individ-
ual to achieve the correct positive and negative balance, but an organization can,
and it best achieves this balance by deliberately setting up an adversarial process,
using devil’s advocacy. The goal of this process is to identify and examine all the
ways in which things can go wrong, in order to institutionalize the critical “glass
half-empty” attitude and ensure that the natural desire for good news to pass on
up the chain of command does not dominate assessment or reporting.
Metrics Collection
I have observed two major types of metrics collection problems. The first prob-
lem, promiscuous metrics collection, breaks down into two parts, self-inflicted
and inflicted from above. Some assessments cells and teams told me they collect
as much information and as many metrics as they can think of, “just in case.” In
these cases, the stated goal was to be able to “change what we analyze as objec-
tives or requests for information change without having to change what we are
collecting.” This results in a high likelihood that many of the collected metrics
are not relevant to the situation being assessed.
In addition, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the ISAF
Joint Command (IJC), and some regional commands have issued “fragmentary
orders” (FRAGOs, or FRAGORDs), requiring the collection of large numbers of
numeric metrics (see, for example, the Regional Operational Design Effects As-
sessment [RODEA] structure used for a while by Regional Command [South],
described in figure 1).16 It is beyond the capacity of most forces in the field to
collect on the large numbers of demanded metrics and produce a credible prod-
uct. Frequent attempts by subject-matter experts to reduce the number of met-
rics by brainstorming are unlikely to help, for two reasons. First, there is no
guarantee that the original lists of metrics contained all those required, so
any reduced list may miss necessary ones; second, it was mostly brainstorming in
the absence of an analytic framework that gave rise to the problem of metrics
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“bloat” in the first place. Trying to
correct a problem by doing the same
thing that created it is unlikely to
succeed.
The second problem, blinkered
metrics collection, attempts to avoid
the first problem but introduces
worse consequences. Some assess-
ments cells told me that they try to
identify up front which metrics are
hard or impossible to collect, and
then set these aside. The problem is
that there is no analysis as to whether
these ignored metrics should be col-
lected, and therefore there is a risk
that critical metrics will be neither
collected nor considered. What is
worse, commanders are not in-
formed that the assessment is ignor-
ing metrics whose importance has not been determined. This jeopardizes the
accuracy of the assessment and hides from the commander and from later asses-
sors the original decision to ignore hard- or impossible-to-collect metrics. Since
the assessment may very well be poor, the credibility of the commander is ulti-
mately placed at risk.
Junk Arithmetic
Using arithmetic on numeric metrics is optional, but the rules of arithmetic are
not optional.17 The following examples of junk arithmetic I encountered suffice
to demonstrate the broader problem.
Many of the assessments processes I observed in-theater take qualitative and
quantitative data, rank order them, and average the rank-order numbers. For ex-
ample, in the RODEA process, assessors coded answers to questions on a point
scale of one through five, similar to the “rating definition levels” used by ISAF and
IJC. These codes are not ratio-scale numbers, and therefore, by the laws of arith-
metic, functions such as “averaging” cannot be performed on them—it would be
meaningless.18 To put this into a familiar context, officer pay grades are rank or-
dered by “O number”—that is, pay grades O-1 (second lieutenant) through O-10
(four-star general). But no one believes that a brigadier general (O-7) is the same
as a major (O-4) paired with a captain (O-3) just because four plus three is
D O W N E S - M A R T I N 1 0 9
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MENT (RODEA) STRUCTURE
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seven.19 Averaging ordinal numbers, such as rank orders, within an assessment
process is just as nonsensical, and this kind of obvious error subjects the credi-
bility of the assessment, and the command promoting it, to justifiable suspicion.
Values for many metrics are obtained using polls. In Afghanistan, these polls
have claimed margins of error of approximately plus or minus 3 percent for na-
tionwide surveys, 5 percent for regions, and 10 percent for districts.20 Given a
plus-or-minus 10 percent margin of error, a district metric would have to
change by approximately 20 percent before one could claim a trend. When a
change is less than approximately double the margin of error, the soundest con-
clusion that can be drawn is “We do not know whether there has been a change
or not.” Unfortunately in most assessments I observed in-theater these margins
of error were ignored, and in a significant number of instances officers claimed
unjustified trends on small changes of data. An “assessments dashboard” I ob-
served did not even have a symbol for “trend unknown,” just check-boxes for
“trend improving,” “static,” and “declining”; it was impossible to report that it
was not known whether there even was a trend. When I asked about this, the of-
ficer in charge replied, “The military does not like to admit we do not know, so
we report one of the dashboard options and then caveat the report.” To report
“We know that this measure is not changing” is obviously not the same as to re-
port “We do not know if this measure is changing”; the two situations have very
different implications for the commander’s decision making. It is doubtful
whether anyone remembers caveats after a trend report has been delivered.
Another observed example of junk arithmetic (this time leading to an overly
optimistic claim) was an Afghan National Police assessment claiming that the
organization was “nearly 100 percent filled.” Examination of the underlying
data showed that patrolmen were overmanned while officers and noncommis-
sioned officers were undermanned, by significant amounts. Whether or not the
assessment reported the underlying data along with the conclusion, the fact re-
mains that “nearly 100 percent filled” simply did not faithfully summarize the
situation in this case. The “nearly 100 percent filled” summary had been derived
by applying junk arithmetic to the underlying data, and all too often the under-
lying data that would reveal the true situation do not make it into the reports.
The use of any arithmetic on numeric metrics in counterinsurgency is subject
to suspicion, the more so when one attempts to roll up the numbers into some
grand score of how well we are doing. Even in a country as stable as the United
States, with all the economic data and information one could conceivably ask for
and no one trying to kill you as you ask for it, we still do not have credible eco-
nomic forecast models that can avoid near-catastrophic economic meltdowns.
Where then is the credible numbers-based model for governance, development,
and security in Afghanistan during an insurgency? Certainly, a professional,
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subjective, qualitative assessment of progress will make use of certain numbers,
but not by running arithmetic functions over them.
Simplistic Color Coding
Senior commanders’ time is a precious and nonrenewable resource; staffs right-
fully guard it jealously. The most common approach in-theater to providing
senior commanders with the conclusions of assessments is to produce a color-
coded map, each district shown in one of five colors indicating the level of suc-
cess there (see figure 2).21 But as has been pointed out and persuasively argued to
a working group of senior officers, including generals, at IJC, “The color-coded
map dilutes transparency and accuracy and offers a simplistic and misleading
representation of the battle space.”22
I have observed that most senior commanders demand narrative explana-
tions from subordinates during briefings and forward narrative assessments up
the chain. However, staffs do not usually collect, document, or store these narra-
tives in a database form suitable for later analysis. Since these senior commanders
D O W N E S - M A R T I N 1 1 1
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apparently believe it is necessary to spend time on narratives, it is necessary to
find a way to present them with pertinent narratives in the first place within
their time constraints. Claiming that color-coded maps serve the purpose is dis-
ingenuous. Any changes in color to a district or province will immediately re-
quire a narrative explanation; any nonchange in color will also require an
explanation of why, despite effort, the situation has not improved. In either case,
it is important in the narrative to answer the questions the briefer knows the
commander is going to ask.
In addition, a color-coded map hides information. The single color coding rep-
resents an average (not a summary) of a large number of underlying factors, most
of which it is nonsensical to average. An average can quite possibly stay the same as
some factors improve and others degrade; the color tells us nothing useful about
this situation, so one must add narrative explanations. Since smart staffs often
provide such narratives anyway, the color-coded map becomes pointless at best
and a misleading time waster at worst.
Logic Failures
Even if valid success/fail statistics exist at the district level, validated and docu-
mented methods of “rolling them up” into a forecast of success or failure at the
regional or national level do not exist. Nor are there any past data on which to
base methods for such roll-ups.
No Compelling Combination of Assessments. Furthermore, validated and docu-
mented models of how to combine assessments across the instruments of na-
tional power (diplomatic/political, information, military, and economic) do not
exist. There is no credible model for how to combine the assessments of objec-
tives within the lines of operation (governance, development, and security) into
a final assessment. Regional commands appear to be “color averaging” when at-
tempting to combine assessments from separate lines of operation. The regional
commands present separate colors for their respective regions for security, gov-
ernance, and development, then provide an overall assessment color that hap-
pens to be the average point on the color-bar chart of the three lines of operation
(see figure 3).23 This is not coincidence; I have observed regional command
briefers struggle to explain in operational terms why they had given a particular
color to an overall assessment.
The combined coding scale for assessing a district or region (see figures 2 and
4) is drawn directly from the population component of what is known as a “sys-
tems thinking” model of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.24 In that model,
each box contains the part of the population described by that box. The model
spreads the population across all five boxes. It is incorrect, however, to interpret
each box as a position on a scale that describes the whole population; the color
1 1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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scale used by coalition forces, as shown in figures 2 and 4, is an incorrect over-
simplification of the original model and cannot describe the majority of popular-
support situations.
For example, this representation cannot handle a polarized society where, say,
50 percent actively support the government and security forces and 50 percent
the insurgency. One solution proposed by a staff in-theater was to assess a polar-
ized example as being neutral, “on the fence.” But clearly a fractured polarized
society is not the same as a neutral society, and this staff was also unable to ex-
plain how it would represent and assess a population equally distributed along
the support dimension (i.e., with 20 percent of the population in each of the five
boxes). This simplistic color-bar approach also cannot handle other very likely
distributions of support (with different percentages of the population distrib-
uted across all support-level boxes). I observed some regional commands
spreading their assessments across two contiguous boxes (as in figure 4); unfor-
tunately, this extension does not solve the problem.
D O W N E S - M A R T I N 1 1 3
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EXAMPLE COLOR-CODED PROVINCIAL ASSESSMENT
This example combines the colors of the assessments of the three lines of operation.
ISAF Joint Command Metrics Workshop.
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No Compelling Connection among Objectives, Metrics, and Assessment. All mil-
itary forces are employed for reasons—in order to achieve end states laid out in
the commander’s objectives—and progress is measured against those end states.
Therefore, the commander’s objectives must determine the metrics used.
I have heard no compelling arguments as to why staffs collected certain met-
rics and not others. For example, a staff at one command claimed it had carried
out a rigorous process but was unable to describe or document what that process
was, who executed it, and why their predecessors had selected those specific met-
rics. Staff members at another command claimed to have decided on its metrics
“from a book or paper, added some from Iraq, and then added a few of our own.”
Another command has had metrics pushed on it multiple times by various aca-
demics, think tanks, and civilian agencies and has been obliged to take these seri-
ously, since their authors have political influence.
Since lines of operation, taken alone and out of context, are broad, any con-
ceivable metric is plausible. For example, during an IJC Metrics Evaluation
Meeting held in Washington, D.C., on 17–18 March 2010, one participant
claimed that “child mortality” was an appropriate metric under “Development.”
Asked to explain how this metric supported counterinsurgency, the participant
replied simply, “Afghan families care about their children.” Unless on such occa-
sions military commanders want to argue in public that they do not care about
the lives of Afghan infants (or whatever other such topics are under discussion)
or are willing to collect on and measure any metric proposed by whoever hap-
pens to be in the room, they had better have clear, cogent reasons for how the
metrics they are using are tied to their objectives, and therefore why other met-
rics are not being collected by their commands.25 Unfortunately, most com-
mands do not appear to have clear connections between their objectives and the
metrics they are collecting;26 and at this conference no sound answer was forth-
coming from the officers present as to how infant mortality was or was not tied to
their counterinsurgency objectives.
Staffs that are unable to justify the metrics they are collecting cannot justify
not collecting others foisted on them by an entire cottage industry of academ-
ics, think tanks, newspaper columnists, retired officers, politicians, and
1 1 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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AN OVERLAPPED ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE
Combined assessment of population support places the entire population into one of five levels of support for GIRoA and security
forces or the insurgency, or into an overlap between two contiguous levels.
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congressional staffers, or by history books about Iraq, or even brainstorms “by
whoever is in the room at the time.” I observed a staff at higher command at-
tempting to reconcile at least four collections of metrics to see which ones were
duplicates and which were new, instead of determining what metrics they
should be collecting, based on the objectives.
No Compelling Connection between Assessment and End State. For operations
in Afghanistan, the end state is, loosely speaking, a region (or district, or the en-
tire country) that is suitable for transition to full GIRoA control, where “suit-
able” means there is some, good chance that the GIRoA will be able to keep it
stable and secure. However, unless we have a credible theory that links the level
of active support for the insurgency to the likelihood of GIRoA successfully run-
ning an area, we have no connection between the rolled-up color-coded assess-
ment and the desired end state. Therefore, the assessment does not provide
senior leaders tasked with judging the suitability of a region or district for tran-
sition with a credible assessment of its suitability. What it does provide to those
decision makers is information from which to argue either way, depending on
political convenience.
Higher-Command Demands for Objective Assessments
ISAF and IJC (supported by higher civilian authority) demand a “set of indica-
tors that complements the commander’s qualitative assessment of the environ-
ment.”27 Unfortunately, in practice, “indicators” are all too often interpreted as
being “quantitative” (or “numeric”) and thus “objective,” whereas the “com-
mander’s qualitative assessment” is seen as “subjective.” An example is a report
from one provincial reconstruction team that referred to “overreliance on quali-
tative and subjective assessments” as a challenge.28
An objective numeric assessment for Afghanistan requires a credible numbers-
based theory of counterinsurgency that is applicable to Afghanistan—a way of
computing from the metrics the probability that if we transitioned an area to
GIRoA the desired end states would endure.29 For such a theory to be credible,
one must be able to apply it to past insurgencies with known metrics and with
known outcomes; at the very least, one would want such data to construct a
model. However, although there have been hundreds of counterinsurgency wars
in the past century, comprehensive data on the operational environments and
how they changed over time have been kept for only a small number of them;30
we do not have enough data for credible success/failure statistics. Some would
argue that the data we have from the approximately four hundred districts in Af-
ghanistan could provide a numbers-based statistical analysis; the problem is we
do not have success/fail outcomes for any of these—the war is not over yet.31
Therefore, we have no outcome data for Afghanistan. Although statistical
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models are applicable at the tactical level (we have large amounts of data con-
cerning tactical/small-unit engagements), they are not applicable to assessing
success or failure at the operational or strategic level (since we do not have statis-
tically valid sample sizes).
Consider the assessment problem faced by Robert Norton, an artilleryman of
the seventeenth century (see figure 5). Despite Norton’s skill at mathematics and
his recognition that mathematics was important to the artilleryman, he did not
have an objective numbers-based theory of external ballistics—Newton had yet
to develop his theory of gravity and equations of motion. Norton could collect
all the numeric data he liked concerning the present (for example, muzzle veloc-
ity, weight of ball, amount of powder, and angle of elevation), but without a
numbers-based theory of ballistics he had to apply subjective professional judg-
ment to those objective and subjective numbers to assess where a shot would fall
in the future. In fact, the subjective judgment of artillerymen in pre-Newtonian
days was superior to the many “objective” but wrong numbers-based assess-
ments published during those times.32
In the absence of a credible numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan, there is no objective, numbers-based assessment for military oper-
ations there. Pretending otherwise gives the illusion of precision without the reality
of accuracy.
For tactical and small-unit actions, performance directly generates predict-
able effects using Newtonian physics (ballistics, logistic flows, time and distance
calculations, etc.) and the statistics of millenniums of documented lessons
learned from small-unit engagements. Furthermore, the time lag between per-
formance and effect is short, seconds to days. One can use measures of perfor-
mance as proxies for measures of effect and rapidly check for the necessity of
changes of plan, since valid numeric theories of physics and valid statistical the-
ories of small-unit tactics exist. However, there are no valid numeric theories for
dealing with operational and strategic levels of counterinsurgency; one must
build logical connections between current actions and future effects on the ob-
jective and then generate the required metrics from the connections. The obses-
sion with objective assessments is tactical thinking applied to strategic problems.
Although purely objective (and numbers-based) predictive theories of the
physical world are possible, the likelihood that the same will become true for
operational- and strategic-level complex social interactions—such as insur-
gency and counterinsurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, and warfare
—in time to be useful in Afghanistan is extremely small. Therefore, operational/
strategic counterinsurgency assessment in Afghanistan must be subjective,
based on senior leaders’ subjective professional judgment of pertinent qualita-
tive and quantitative data.33 Even if all relevant data were available and all of
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them accurate, numeric, and objective, assessing what they mean for success is
still a professional military subjective judgment call, since there is no credible,
objective numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency.
DISTRUST GENERATED BY POOR ASSESSMENT PRACTICE
The military’s focus on good-news stories, obviously flawed arithmetic and logic,
and lack of transparency causes the press to distrust military statements. It then
looks for and writes about what appear to be contradictions between military
statements and reality; higher civilian authority then demands explanations from
ISAF commanders. Both higher civilian authority and IJC accordingly demand
“objective assessments using metrics to complement the commander’s subjective
in-the-field assessment”and then push metrics systems down the chain for collec-
tion. The message is clear: they do not trust military commanders’ assessments. A re-
action I observed was a demand from higher command to the relevant regional
D O W N E S - M A R T I N 1 1 7
FIGURE 5
Artillery illustrations published before the existence of a numbers-based physics of gravity show impossible exterior ballistic trajectories. Artillerymen had to as-
sess fall of shot subjectively, on the basis of objective measurements.
Norton, Gunner. See note 32.
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command to provide good-news stories to counter media claims of military fail-
ure. This makes the military look defensive, makes the distrust worse, and spreads
the distrust to the domestic population, upon whose political support for the mis-
sion the military relies for funding.
In my opinion, the number of metrics demanded overwhelms the collection
capacity of regional commands’ partner civilian organizations and major sup-
porting commands. Furthermore, neither those organizations nor supporting
commands appear to trust the value of collecting on those metrics or of assess-
ments done using them. For example I was openly told by a head of planning in
one civilian two-star-equivalent organization that in response to his regional
command’s request for assessment metrics he makes up what he does not have
and does not check the quality of what he does have. An additional reason given
me for not taking metrics seriously was the absence of feedback from requesting
organizations. Another example is the attitude one colonel encountered when
he asked troops in the field whether they “collected all the requested metrics or
made stuff up”; the response was foot-shuffling and “Is this a trick question,
sir?” Additionally, civilian partner organizations have expressed annoyance and
suspicion of the military when the military lines of operation overlap civilian
ones (such as governance and development).
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
A regional commander and staff must separate the task of responding to higher
commanders’ requests for information to feed their assessment processes from the
task of assessing the regional command’s own progress with its own operational
war-fighting objectives, to provide its own assessors time for the latter.
The pathologies inherent in higher command’s assessment processes, specifi-
cally the enormous numbers of metrics demanded, mean that the regional com-
mand staff members responsible for responding to requests for information
from higher command should not be the same people who must assess the re-
gional command’s progress with its own operational objectives. Otherwise there
will never be time to do the latter, because the former inevitably comes first. If
the same people have to do both tasks, the commander must set a maximum per-
centage of time they are to spend responding to requests for information from
higher command in order to ensure they have time to produce adequate assess-
ments for the regional commander.
Regional commands must decide what metrics are required to support as-
sessment of their operational objectives. As we have seen, at the tactical level
Newtonian physics and the statistics of millenniums of small-unit engagements
provide a model for generating metrics and using those metrics to assess effects.
At the operational level, there is no established numeric model for translating
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performance into effect, and as argued, no credible numeric model is forthcom-
ing. The regional command must build a qualitative understanding of the inter-
acting elements of the operational environment in order to understand that
environment, identify relevant assessment metrics, and erect a defense against
externally imposed, plausible, but irrelevant metrics.34 Build the model by ana-
lyzing commander’s intent during the mission-analysis phase—that is, answer
the question, “Why are the objectives important in the context of the objectives
and associated desired end states?”—and collect the answers in concise narrative
form. (If they cannot be expressed in clear English, slide-show bullets, “Penta-
gonese,” and cartoons just hide that fact.) The narrative generates metrics
—“things we want more of and things we want less of ”—with explanation, and
clusters these into topics of interest. The narrative is the summary of subject-
matter experts’ opinions on how the environment works, within the context of
the objectives, end states, ways, and means. The logic within the narrative pro-
vides a qualitative understanding of what is likely to happen as regional com-
mand actions alter the qualitative and quantitative values of the metrics. The
assessment team then uses professional subjective judgment and the logic
within the narratives to assess the implications of the collected metric informa-
tion against the assessment question we have already postulated.
Identify Operational/Strategic Objectives and End States from the Relevant
Operation Orders, FRAGOs, or Other Planning Documents. If the objectives are
at the operational/tactical, or lower, level of war, use lines of operation instead of
objectives. For each objective, identify the end states; if these are not explicitly
available in the planning documents, analyze the documents for implied end
states. Identify explicit and implicit “critical requirements” and “in order to”
statements attached to the objectives in the planning documents; these are the
critical requirements for success.
Write the “Assessment Question.” For operations in Afghanistan this will likely
be of the form given above: “What is the likelihood of, and what are the risks to,
the conditions for the specified end states occurring or remaining stable if the
region transitions from coalition force control to GIRoA?”
Analyze Commander’s Intent. For each critical requirement, ask the question,
“Why is this important to coalition forces, to the insurgents, to the population,
to GIRoA, to our partners, to our governments?”35 There will likely be more than
one answer, but restrict yourself to the important answers; they help identify
strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities for friends, enemies, and other stake-
holders in the context of the specific objective. For each answer, in turn, ask the
same question—“Why is this important?”—and continue until you can make a
logical and clear link to the end state. Write a narrative expressing the chain of
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links between the objective and the end state. There will be a temptation when
analyzing intent to focus on “what we want to happen.” However, the real ques-
tion is, “Why is this important?”—and so it is also necessary to consider what we
do not want to happen. In addition, one should consider the most dangerous and
the most likely actions or reactions of the stakeholders, including the “upsides”
of any “downside,” and the downsides of any upside.36
Use a variety of sources to generate the answers and to build the narrative, in-
cluding planning documents, conversations and interviews with colleagues, in-
ternal advisers, external subject-matter experts and organizations, literature and
databases, and your own professional military knowledge. Although regional
command staffs are the experts in military matters, they are not the experts in
politics, economics, social information, or infrastructure and must seek external
assistance for these areas.37
Note that the analyses of intent of the various objectives will overlap each
other. This is expected, since multiple objectives apply to the same area of opera-
tions and support the same set of end states. Overlap in the analysis of intent
represents the linkages between the objectives. However, one should write each
narrative as though the reader were going to read only that one—introduce the
overlaps but focus on the core objective (or line of operation).
Identify Topics and Metrics. For each narrative, identify the actors and their ac-
tions, as well as their strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities implied in the
narratives. Pay attention to “who is doing what to whom” and to “who wants, or
does not want, what”—that is, to the verbs and nouns (hence the emphasis on
declarative English). From these factors derive your topics.38
Analysis of commander’s intent explains why these topics are important and
guides collectors in the field. Analysis of the narratives concerning the topics will
provide the specific metrics. For example, a critical capability for a governance-
related objective might be “tax base of the GIRoA,” resulting in a “tax base”
topic. Metrics might be “tax revenues,” “tax revenues skimmed,” “taxes avoided,”
etc., to give the required picture of the “tax base” topic. Just as commander’s in-
tent is part of military operational art, the selection of metrics to cover topics is
also a matter of art guided by analysis of commander’s intent.
Each narrative for an objective may contain more than one discussion linking
the objective to the end state. It may be useful to prioritize them within each nar-
rative, thus prioritizing the topics and metrics, in order to discard less important
topics and metrics if their numbers grow too large. Important topics may include
some that are risky to collect (for example, likelihood of casualties suffered during
collection), expensive to collect (because, for example, they require resources not
currently allocated), or impossible to collect (inherently unknowable). Identify
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these and inform leadership: uncollected pertinent metrics introduce risk to the
quality of the assessment and hence to the credibility of the command and of the
commander. “Unknowables” aside, it is up to the leadership to decide whether to
accept the risk of an incomplete assessment by ignoring topics and metrics or to
accept the risk of collecting on them.39
Provide Guidance to Collectors. Provide collectors the topics (not the full collec-
tion of metrics) and the intent behind them (the analysis of commander’s in-
tent); do not ask for numeric metrics;40 ask for patrol reports, with whatever
numbers and narrative they can provide about the topics. This approach avoids
overburdening troops or other collectors in the field by pushing initiative down
to the lowest possible level, and it allows collectors in the field latitude to inter-
pret what they should collect and can deliver within the context of local condi-
tions and commander’s guidance.
Make the Assessment. Argue the case both for (optimistic) and against (pessi-
mistic) a successful outcome, and then make a final judgment based on the two
cases. As would be done in legal proceedings, provide, along with the final judg-
ment and the reasons for it, both “for” (optimistic) and “against” (pessimistic)
arguments and all the evidence. If the resources are available, have separate
teams do the optimistic and pessimistic assessments and argue their respective
cases to a senior assessor for final assessment. Otherwise, do the pessimistic as-
sessment first.
Gather all the evidence that supports the negative answer to the assessment
question—that is, that the likelihood of success is low and the risks are high. Us-
ing professional military judgment, pessimistically assess the risk to different ar-
eas of the commander’s intent were the district to transition from coalition force
to full GIRoA control on some specified date. Make as persuasive a professional
argument as possible for a pessimistic answer; record it, along with the evidence.
Be rigorous and ruthless when doing the pessimistic assessment; any squea-
mishness here will result in challenges to the final assessment in (probably) an
embarrassing arena.
Then gather all the evidence that supports a positive answer to the assessment
question—that the likelihood of success is high and the risks low. Again, using
professional military judgment, assess the risk to different areas of the com-
mander’s intent, but this time optimistically, were the district to transition from
coalition force to full GIRoA control on some specified date. Again, make as per-
suasive a professional argument as possible, recording the evidence along with
the optimistic assessment.
Finally, examine the two cases, their arguments and their evidence, and de-
cide on an overall assessment of likelihood and risks. Pay particular attention to
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pessimistic items that overwhelm positive ones and to positive items that fix
negative ones. Record the final assessment and the reasons for it. When one pro-
duces good “for and against” arguments before making a final case, not only is
the quality of the assessment improved but opposition to the assessment is more
likely to focus on the interpretation of evidence and not the integrity or compe-
tence of the assessors.
{LINE-SPACE}
The flaws in the operations assessment processes I observed in-theater clearly pro-
duce untrustworthy decision support; they are so manifest that commanders
place their own credibility at risk when they support the resulting assessments.
Regional commanders have the authority and means to fix operations assessment
within their commands. However, doing so requires institutionalizing a rigorous
process and separating it from the task of responding to higher-command re-
quests for information. If the regional commander decides that this separation is
unacceptable or does not have the time or staff resources to implement it, an alter-
native is to base the regional command’s operations assessment entirely on its
commander’s subjective professional judgment combined with that of the re-
gion’s civilian provincial reconstruction team and of other regional stakeholders.
The continued use of junk arithmetic and flawed logic robs decision makers of
the most essential requirements that assessment is supposed to supply—sound,
verifiable, and accurate information upon which to make life-and-death
decisions.
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1. U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publi-
cation [hereafter JP] 3-0 (17 September 2006,
incorporating change 2, 22 March 2010), p.
IV-30, available at www.dtic.mil/; U.S. Joint
Staff, Joint Operation Planning, JP 5-0 (26 De-
cember 2006), p. III-57, available at www.dtic
.mil/; U.S. Army Dept., Counterinsurgency,
Field Manual [hereafter FM] 3-24 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: 15 December 2006), para. 5-90,
describes assessment in similar terms; avail-
able at www.fas.org/(FM 3-24 is also issued
by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, as Ma-
rine Corps Warfare Publication [MCWP]
3-33.5).
2. JP 3-0, p. IV-31.
3. Although “forecast” and “predict” are often
used interchangeably, I use “forecast” as a
broad description of a likely future rather
than a precise “prediction” of exactly what
will happen.
4. Note that one can replace “region” with “dis-
trict” or “Afghanistan,” depending on the
level of the assessment. The commander’s
plan should specify the end states and will
probably include items dealing with security,
stability, economic development, governance,
al-Qa‘ida, etc. Also, the “specified date” can
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be any date that is useful, either in the future
or the present. See JP 3-0, sec. IV, for a broad
discussion of end states and objectives.
5. It is worth noting what the assessment cell’s
task is not. The assessment cell does not de-
cide how to achieve the operational objectives
or what to do to achieve the conditions for
success. Those are planning functions. The
assessment cell’s mission is to assess how well
the executed plan is achieving the end states
that the objectives are supposed to enable and
the risks to that achievement.
6. The three lines of operation for coalition
forces in Afghanistan are “governance,” “eco-
nomic development,” and “security.” Devel-
oping the Afghan National Police or army is a
separate topic, and I do not deal with it in
this article. See FM 3-24, chap. 5, for a broad
discussion of the “Logical Lines of Opera-
tion” during counterinsurgency operations.
7. Belief in pseudoscience and conspiracy
theories and inability to use valid reasoning
are disturbingly frequent in the American
population—see “Science and Technology:
Public Attitudes and Public Understanding,”
National Science Foundation: Science and En-
gineering Indicators 2002, www.nsf.gov/, esp.
“How Widespread Is Belief in Pseudosci-
ence?” It would be unwise to assume that ex-
cellence in leadership is incompatible with
these kinds of thinking failure. Such thinking
failures are not a cause for concern when
those involved are facing familiar operational
and strategic situations of the kind they have
successfully dealt with in the past. However,
experience with past operational (or strate-
gic) situations is only as relevant to the cur-
rent situation as the past and current
situations are similar.
8. See J. Scott Armstrong, Principles of Forecast-
ing: A Handbook for Researchers and Practi-
tioners (New York: Springer, 2001), for a
good overall introduction to forecasting. See
also Forecasting Principles: Evidence-Based
Forecasting, www.forecastingprinciples.com/.
9. I have also observed these flaws throughout
both the U.S. Department of Defense and ci-
vilian commercial organizations—as would
be expected, since the root causes are present
throughout the Defense Department and ci-
vilian worlds.
10. FM 3-24 is the closest the U.S. military has to
a theory of counterinsurgency; however, it
does not even come close to providing a
numbers-based theory, and no one pretends
that it does so.
11. I use the broader, explanatory form of pessi-
mism and optimism concerning value judg-
ments on the agreed facts, rather than the
dispositional form, concerning one’s confi-
dence in the success of an endeavor—hence
the traditional “glass half-empty versus glass
half-full” value judgment rather than any im-
plication as to the effects of the glass’s state of
emptiness on the success of an endeavor.
12. See, for example, Karl R. Popper, The Logic of
Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books,
1959), and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, s.v. “Karl Popper,” plato.stanford.edu/.
13. See Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelli-
gence Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for
the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency), chap. 8, available at https://www.cia
.gov/. Note that the very public arguments
criticizing analysis of competing hypotheses
(ACH) deal mostly with failures to execute
the method properly or with the difficulties
of executing the method. See Tim van Gelder,
“Hypothesis Testing: What’s Wrong with
ACH?,” Tim van Gelder: Bringing Visual Clar-
ity to Complex Issues, timvangelder.com/, and
“How Not to Free Your Mind,” The Inter-
preter: Lowy Institute for International Policy,
www.lowyinterpreter.org/. Both these criti-
cisms hold for any valid analysis method, and
the idea that the validity of a method depends
on the ease of its use is ludicrous.
14. See, for example, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, s.vv. “Naturalized Epistemology”
and “Underdetermination of Scientific
Theory.”
15. The use of negative words such as “fail,” “dis-
prove,” and “weakness” may be problematic
to some people’s professional ethos. How-
ever, the rules of logic are not optional, the
value of the scientific approach is proven, and
one ignores either at one’s peril.
16. Maj. Jonathan Roginski (10th Mountain Di-
vision) informs me that “under the guidance
of William Upshur and David Kilcullen the
Afghanistan Assessment Group of Regional
Command (South) replaced RODEA”
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in September 2010 “with a system of 17
indicators—informing 11 metrics—describing
the environment and critical conditions spe-
cific to southern Afghanistan in the spring
and summer of 2011, narrowing the process
to only that which is central to the environ-
ment and the mission.”
17. The rules of arithmetic—including the fact
that adding or averaging rank orders is
nonsense—were established over two millen-
niums ago by, among others, Pythagoras and
are taught in every elementary school
worldwide.
18. The attempt to get around this by scoring
metrics using Likert-like items (for example,
the five-point rating definition level) fails,
since with every point defined by a text de-
scription the numbers associated with each
text item are rank-ordered ordinals that, by
the rules of arithmetic, cannot be averaged
(or have any other arithmetic function used
on them).
19. It may be that in certain instances one can re-
place a brigadier general by a major paired
with a captain, but I suggest that in these
cases one has other problems that are beyond
the scope of the assessments process.
20. These margins of error appear to be those
that would be computed from the population
sizes if there were no corruption, fraud, or in-
timidation involved in the data collection.
Therefore, these margins of error are at best
the minimum error, and in my opinion it is
highly probable that they are much greater
within the context of Afghanistan.
21. “IJC Metrics Assessment” (IJC briefing to the
ISAF Joint Command Metrics Workshop,
Washington, D.C., 17–18 March 2010), slide
15. Note that, in addition to the five colors,
“white” indicates “not assessed.”
22. By Ben Connable, at discussions held 5 May
2010. See also Ben Connable, “Afghanistan
Assessments and Metrics: Trip Report Analy-
sis and Recommendations for ISAF and ISAF
Joint Command” (document MG 1086,
RAND Corp., 2011).
23. “IJC Metrics Assessment,” slide 29.
24. See PA Consulting Group, Dynamic Planning
for COIN in Afghanistan (London: 2009),
available at msnbcmedia.msn.com/.
25. They may very well be important or even vital
to other commands or government agencies,
but unless they are tied to this command’s ob-
jectives, they are not important to it.
26. Other than the promiscuous approach of
“This metric appears to have something to do
with the objective, so therefore we must col-
lect on it.”
27. IJC guidance to the ISAF Joint Command
Metrics Workshop.
28. Coffey International Development, “Intro-
duction to the Helmand Monitoring & Eval-
uation Programme,” Helmand Provincial
Reconstruction Team, Afghanistan, October
2010.
29. In scientific parlance, a “theory” is not an un-
proved speculation but a hypothesis (or a sys-
tem of hypotheses) that has been so verified
through testing that to deny it contingent
upon acceptance would be perverse, where a
“hypothesis” is an untested (but testable)
proposal for how some part of the world
might work.
30. Dr. Jonathan Schroden, in personal conversa-
tion, 4 January 2011.
31. For the figure of four hundred districts, see
Statoids, s.v. “Districts of Afghanistan,” www
.statoids.com/. For outcomes, Dr. Jonathan
Schroden points out (note 30) that one could
look to some of the districts in Kabul Prov-
ince to see what “success” looks like—though
he counterargues as well that Kabul is a spe-
cialized case, given how urban it is compared
to the rest of Afghanistan.
32. See, for example, the trajectory illustrations
in Robert Norton, The Gunner (n.p.: Hum-
phrey Robinson, 1628), and in Diego Ufano,






It was not until over half a century later, in
1687, that Isaac Newton provided an objec-
tive numbers-based theory of ballistics in his
Principia.
33. A combination of diplomatic/political, infor-
mational/ideological, military, and economic
leadership and expertise must be involved.
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34. “A comprehensive systems perspective con-
siders the interaction between the individual
elements of a system and across multiple sys-
tems (political, military, economic, social, in-
formational, infrastructure, and others)”; JP
5-0, p. III-22. “Joint planners analyze the op-
erational environment in terms of six interre-
lated operational variables: political, military,
economic, social, information, and infra-
structure”; U.S. Army Dept., Operations, FM
3-0 (Washington, D.C.: February 2008), p.
1-5, available at downloads.army.mil/.
35. This does not “second-guess the com-
mander”; it is a drilling-down into the details
of the commander’s intent, placing them
within the context of the environment and
using the commander’s objectives and staff
planning documents as the primary inputs. It
states what it is about the environment that is
critical for a valid assessment; it covers politi-
cal, military, economic, social, informational/
ideological, and infrastructural issues, identi-
fying the relevant stakeholders (own forces,
coalition forces, friendly forces, enemy forces,
the local population, etc.). It is analogous to
the “intelligence preparation of the opera-
tional environment” carried out during mis-
sion planning.
36. For example, the downside of damaging
Taliban finances by poppy eradication might
be an upsurge in murder and intimidation by
the Taliban to make up for its inability to buy
labor from the local population. The upside
of Taliban murder and intimidation, in turn,
might be an opportunity for the coalition to
engage in information operations.
37. Since for most topics there is a surplus of
subject-matter experts, grouped into several
“schools of thought” that often contradict
each other, the choice of which “school” to
incorporate into assessments amounts to a
command decision. The difficulty is to bal-
ance subject-matter experts whose views
match the regional commander’s or who are
“popular” with those holding opposing or
unpopular views. See Philip Tetlock, Expert
Political Judgment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Univ. Press, 2005), for an analysis of how the
popularity of an expert is a poor measure of
the quality of that expert’s forecasts.
38. For the purposes of this article, “topic” refers
to a broad subject (for example, education),
and “metric” refers to an item of data (quali-
tative or quantitative) whose collection tells
us something about that broad subject (for
example, the number of schools).
39. The latter may require reallocation of re-
sources and perhaps adjustment of the plan.
40. An officer briefing several multistar generals
in May 2010 told them there were seven
schools in the area. However, another credi-
ble source had previously stated that there
were three, although no one mentioned that
figure at the briefing. It was only afterward
that the discrepancy was tracked down: there
were three “brick” schools and four “tent”
schools. Asking for the “number of schools”
will produce a number, but if the quantity of
metrics demanded is too high (which it cur-
rently is), amplifying and useful narrative will
not result. Asking instead for the topic—“De-
scribe the state of schools in your area”—and
explaining in terms of the commander’s in-
tent why we are asking is much more likely to
generate useful information.
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